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One of the questions that occupied me while I was S. D. Joshi's student and for some time 
afterwards concerned the general workings of Påˆini's grammar. I came to think that the 
numerous references to meanings in the A∑†ådhyåy¥ were too often overlooked by scholars, 
and that these references to meanings might play an essential role in derivations. I collected 
evidence supporting the view that meanings constitute the input of Påˆinian derivations, the 
output being linguistic utterances, primarily sentences. Once this position established, at 
least to my own satisfaction, I concentrated on its possible consequences. If meanings are 
all that important in Påˆini's grammar, one might expect that they are clearly indicated. 
This is indeed the case for practically all grammatical elements introduced, but the situation 
is less clear where nominal stems and verbal roots are concerned. Påˆini's grammar and its 
appendices do not in general give the meanings of nominal stems. This is not surprising, 
because a list of the kind gaur gavi, aßva˙ aßve, puru∑a˙ puru∑e would decidedly look 
superfluous. Verbal roots, on the other hand, are accompanied by meaning entries in the 
dhåtupå†ha, which is what we would except in view of the important role which meanings 
presumably play. However, there is a tradition which maintains that these meaning entries 
in the dhåtupå†ha are not original, that they have been added by someone at a later date. I 
decided to make an in-depth study of the reliability of this tradition and arrived at the 
conclusion that a judicious evaluation of the evidence does not support it: meaning entries 
are an authentic and original part of the dhåtupå†ha. 
 My understanding of the unidirectional nature of grammatical derivations starting 
from meanings has met with approval from a number of Påˆinian scholars, some of whom 
expressed similar ideas, both before and after my paper came out (1980).1 Cardona (1999: 
298 n. 75) has recently gone to the extent of suggesting that I, like van Nooten before me, 
tried to prove something which “was well known and did not require being proved anew”. 
The idea, on the other hand, that meaning entries were an original part of the dhåtupå†ha 
has drawn little attention. Both my positions have been explicitly criticized on at least one 
                                                
* This paper was first presented at the Påˆini Workshop in honor of S. D. Joshi, held at Stanford University, 
March 1-2, 2002. 
1 Buiskool, 1939: 16; Kiparsky & Staal, 1969; van Nooten, 1969; Joshi & Roodbergen, 1980: viii ff.; 1981: 70 
f.; Kiparsky, 1982: 26 ff.; Deshpande, 1987; 1990; 1992. 
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occasion each. I propose to briefly discuss the alternative views, and then turn to some new 
evidence that has a bearing on the issue of meaning entries in the dhåtupå†ha. 
 The view that meanings are the starting point of the derivational process has been 
criticized in a recent article by Jan E. M. Houben (1999). Houben's criticism has two 
components. First he considers some of the arguments that have been presented by different 
authors in support of the initial position of semantic elements, and finds them less than 
convincing. Next he presents some reflections on the practical use of the A∑†ådhyåy¥, 
already in Påˆini's time, and on its users; these reflections lead him to some conclusions as 
to what Påˆini's grammar must have been, and done, in the hands of its users. Let us first 
consider what are, according to Houben, the weaknesses of the arguments in support of an 
initial position for semantic elements in the derivational process. 
 Houben directs his criticism first of all against an article by Kiparsky and Staal from 
1969, from which he cites two passages, which I will repeat here. These two authors 
distinguish four levels which a grammatical derivation will pass through. About these levels 
they state the following (Kiparsky & Staal, 1969: 84; cited Houben, 1999: 26): 
 
The derivation of a sentence starts at level (1) from its meaning. A set of rules then 
specifies the kåraka relations. Påˆini next introduces the cases or other 
morphological categories which correspond to these kåraka relations. Lastly he 
introduces the actual phonological forms which express these morphological 
categories, thereby reaching level (4). 
 
Houben is surprised that, after this general depiction of the workings of Påˆini's grammar, 
the same article by Kiparsky and Staal ends with the following remarks (1969: 107-08; 
cited Houben, 1999: 26): 
 
Påˆini's grammar is an explicit set of rules for deriving the phonetic form of 
sentences from their semantic form via two intermediate stages which bear 
significant similarities to the deep and surface structure levels of generative 
grammar. The semantic form of sentences is characterized mainly in terms of a set 
of semantic relations between the meanings of the verb and its various adjuncts in 
the sentence. To a large extent these relations remain sketchy, ... It does not appear 
that Påˆini intended to generate semantic representations. To the extent that the 
semantic level is developed and its categories specified, it is taken for granted, and 
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no attempt is made to characterize the set of possible semantic representations by 
any rules. (my italics, JB) 
 
Houben then adds the following comments of his own (1999: 26-27): 
 
One wonders how the semantic level can be placed at the basis and, as far as 
derivations are concerned, at the beginning of the sophisticated grammar of Påˆini, 
while it is admitted at the same time that this semantic level is very sketchy, and that 
Påˆini makes no attempt to characterize the set of possible semantic representations 
by any rules. 
 
Houben's comments are interesting because they start from the assumption that in Påˆini's 
“sophisticated grammar”, as he calls it, the basic semantic level should not be very sketchy 
and should have been characterized by rules. Elsewhere in his article Houben protests, 
rightly in my opinion, against the notion of Påˆini as an “isolated genius” (p. 34), and of his 
grammar as the product of “pure science”. Houben also observes that “it may be disputed 
whether modern theory has ever produced satisfactory formalizations of semantics in a 
natural language” (p. 45). In maintaining that the basic semantic level should not be sketchy 
and should be characterized by rules, Houben himself would seem to be falling in the trap 
of assuming that Påˆini's grammar should be perfect. Starting from the assumed perfection 
of the A∑†ådhyåy¥, and perhaps from his conviction that its author was a genius, Houben 
uses the insufficiencies which he finds in the semantic level as evidence against an 
interpretation in which the semantic level is the point of departure of the derivational 
process. 
 Houben has the same objection which he has against the position of Kiparsky and 
Staal in connection with the position which I expressed in my article in 1980. It is not 
necessary to go into details. I will rather, once again, cite a short passage from Houben's 
article (1999: 29): 
 
The objection to the Kiparsky & Staal model of Påˆini's grammar applies also to the 
one suggested by Bronkhorst, although Bronkhorst uses a different terminology. 
Just as a semantic level with sketchy representations of semantic relations can 
hardly be accepted as forming the basis and starting point of Påˆini's grammar, in 
the same way the terms which Bronkhorst considers to be Påˆini's ‘semantic 
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elements’ are too vague and insufficient to initiate the procedure of Påˆini's 
grammar and to direct them with precision towards the desired utterances. 
 
In other words, Påˆini's grammar is perfect, or almost perfect, and the fact that the semantic 
elements are too vague and incapable to lead with precision to the desired utterances 
supposedly proves that these semantic elements cannot be the point of departure of 
derivations. Houben does not criticize the arguments in favor of an initial semantic level in 
derivations themselves; he merely draws attention to the weaknesses — or rather: the 
incompleteness — of Påˆini's grammar which this model brings to light. 
 
One may feel sympathetic toward Houben's approach and grant that an interpretation in 
which no such weaknesses show up, and which accounts for all the same features of the 
A∑†ådhyåy¥, is to be preferred to the one which accepts a semantic level as point of 
departure. Houben prefers to situate Påˆini's grammar in a historical context of users who 
had reasons of their own to study and use this grammar. He puts it as follows (p. 38): “If we 
place Påˆini's grammar in its contemporary context, it cannot be maintained that it starts 
with meanings or with semantics. The grammatical procedures start with the user, a person 
about whom we can say a few things from the outset.” (my italics, JB) Having discussed 
what he thinks we know about the user, Houben then continues (p. 40): 
 
When these abilities and conditions of the user of Påˆini's grammar are taken into 
account, it cannot be maintained that it starts with mere meanings or with an 
abstract semantic level. Rather, it could be said that Påˆini's grammar starts with a 
provisional statement, namely, the provisional statement which the user has in mind 
or which has already been uttered (either by the user of the grammar or by someone 
else) in a certain context. In the course of the derivation of the words of the 
provisional statement, the user is at crucial points asked to refer to it and to make 
certain judgments and decisions — up to a certain point where he can transfer 
control to the grammar in order to arrive at the correct, desirable form. 
 
It is not my intention to find fault with Houben's article, which contains many interesting 
and important observations. I do think, however, that he here confuses two altogether 
different issues. Pointing out how Påˆini's grammar was used, perhaps right from the 
beginning, is not the same as determining what its internal logic is like. I would like to 
illustrate this with a simple example drawn from my experience as a teacher of Sanskrit. 
FROM MEANING TO UTTERANCE  5 
 
 
Most, perhaps all, available grammars of Sanskrit teach the rules of sandhi in such a 
manner that a diligent student will be able to apply them while composing sentences in 
Sanskrit. Most users of those grammars, however, have no intention to ever compose 
anything whatsoever in Sanskrit; their aim is to understand texts that have been composed 
by others, usually long ago. That is to say, few users of Sanskrit grammars use the rules of 
sandhi as taught. They rather use them the other way round, so as to dissolve the sandhi 
which they find in their texts. And yet no Sanskrit grammar known to me takes the point of 
view of the reader. All of them present the rules of sandhi as if the users of those grammars 
intended to create compositions in Sanskrit, which they don't. This means that no amount of 
information about the modern users of Sanskrit grammars will allow us to predict how the 
rules of sandhi are actually presented in those grammars. Worse, information about the 
modern users of Sanskrit grammars may lead us astray in our expectations regarding the 
way in which these grammars will teach sandhi. 
 This example shows that the workings of a grammar do not necessarily tell us much 
about the way it is used. One can however maintain that they tell us something about what 
is felt to be natural. The natural order of sandhi is from separate words to joined words. 
Påˆini may have felt that the natural order of a derivation is from meanings to utterances, 
independently of the question whether the users of his grammar would follow that order. 
 Houben may very well be right in his observations about the original users of 
Påˆini's grammar. Unfortunately this information tells us nothing whatsoever about the way 
in which this grammar actually works. Its actual workings cannot be discovered by finding 
out who its users were and what they wanted. It can only be discovered by analysing the 
grammar itself. And the analyses that have been carried out in this connection put semantics 
at the beginning of derivations. 
 Houben ends up proposing a model of Påˆini's system which is after all not all that 
different from the ones he criticizes. He argues convincingly that semantic elements in the 
widest sense — he distinguishes between semantics, pragmatics and intentionality — may 
exert an influence right through the derivation up to its final stages. This seems to me 
interesting and important, but not necessarily or inherently related to the way in which the 
grammar was used or was meant to be used in practice. 
 It is legitimate to ask why Påˆini chose this particular way of presenting derivations. 
I have already suggested that Påˆini may have felt that this was the natural order of 
derivations. At this point we may insist, with Houben, that we should try to place Påˆini in 
his historical and cultural context and stop treating him as an isolated genius. It will indeed 
be interesting to look for cultural presuppositions, which were perhaps not normally 
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expressed in an explicit manner, that may explain why Påˆini found this the natural order of 
derivations.2 Such cultural presuppositions may be found, as I suggested years ago, by 
trying to understand the role of meanings in Påˆinian derivations against the background of 
a particularly widespread phenomenon in late-Vedic literature: etymologizing. I will not 
enter into details here, but recall that the etymologizing which we find in the Vedic 
Bråhmaˆas, in Yåska's Nirukta and elsewhere is based upon the assumption that the 
meanings of words result from combining the meanings of their parts.3 Combining 
elementary meanings was apparently not looked upon as problematic; combining the 
elements that give expression to them, i.e. the morphemes, was. Påˆini's grammar shows 
how this happens in the case of regular derivations. Understanding the A∑†ådhyåy¥ in this 
way does not — contrary to what Houben suggests (1999: 31-32) — amount to claiming 
that Påˆini's grammar was primarily intended to propound some abstract, theoretical ideas 
or truths while denying the practical value it may have had in the life of people. The two 
issues seem to me unrelated. 
 
My conclusions4 regarding the meaning entries in the dhåtupå†ha to the extent that they 
were there from the beginning have not found general acceptance.5 Houben, in the same 
article as above (1999: 29 n. 7), qualifies them as “unlikely”; Wujastyk (1996: 391) ignores 
them;6 Cardona (1984: 81 n. 13; 1999: 141 f.) rejects them. Unfortunately no one seems to 
have studied my arguments in any detail; no attempts to refute them are at any rate known 
to me. This is not the occasion to review these arguments. I will however use the occasion 
to briefly discuss the way in which Cardona deals with the question. 
 In his book Recent Research in Påˆinian Studies, Cardona (1999: 141) sums  up the 
situation in the following words: 
 
A major piece of evidence indicating that meaning entries did not occur in the 
original dhåtupå†ha is what Kåtyåyana says in his first two vårttikas on [Påˆini] 
1.3.1 ... Bronkhorst [(1981)] considers this and other evidence from the Mahåbhå∑ya 
and attempts to show that the evidence does not require one to conclude that 
                                                
2 In this context it may be relevant to draw attention to two statements by Patañjali in his Mahåbhå∑ya, already 
referred to by van Nooten (1969: 246), to the extent that words depend on meaning, and not vice versa; Mahå-
bh I p. 114 l. 14 (on P. 1.1.46 vt. 4): arthanimittaka eva ßabda˙; III p. 253 l. 14 (on P. 7.1.33 vt. 5): 
arthanimittakena nåma ßabdena bhavitavyam. 
3 See Bronkhorst, 1981a; 1998. 
4 In Bronkhorst, 1981. 
5 An exception is Staal, 1995. 
6 He merely states: "Perhaps one thousand years after Påˆini's creation of the Dhåtupå†ha, the list was 
supplemented by the addition of a brief meaning lexeme added to each root." 
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Patañjali knew a dhåtupå†ha without meaning entries. Cardona (1984) once more 
took up the major Mahåbhå∑ya evidence and concluded that, on the contrary, this 
indicates the dhåtupå†ha received by earliest Påˆin¥yas did not have meaning 
entries. 
 
Cardona singles out for attention, here and in his earlier article, the Mahåbhå∑ya passage 
which constitutes the at first sight most convincing reason to believe that there were no 
meaning entries in the original dhåtupå†ha. Kåtyåyana and Patañjali here cite the unit 
bhvedh, which combines the first and second roots of the dhåtupå†ha: bhË and edh. This 
mention of bhvedh might be taken to show that the roots in the original dhåtupå†ha were not 
separated from each other. The present dhåtupå†ha with meaning entries does however 
separate the roots; the roots bhË and edh occur here as: bhË sattåyåm edha v®ddhau. This 
might seem to justify the conclusion that, since originally nothing separated the roots, there 
were no meaning entries in the original dhåtupå†ha. 
 I have argued in my 1981 article that the situation is not quite as simple as this. 
Cardona on the other hand, who accepts the above line of reasoning, should be expected to 
be of the opinion that the original dhåtupå†ha began with bhvedh.7 Surprisingly, this is not 
his position. He concludes (1984: 83)8: “Påˆini's dhåtupå†ha originally listed verbs 
separately, without sandhi substitutions, and also without meaning entries.” In other words, 
he agrees with me that the original dhåtupå†ha did not begin with bhvedh, and that the roots 
in the original dhåtupå†ha were listed separately. He does think that the dhåtupå†ha to which 
Kåtyåyana and Patañjali allude began with bhvedh, but he denies the same for the 
dhåtupå†ha which Påˆini himself adopted. Cardona therefore, in order to maintain his 
position, has to assume that the dhåtupå†ha known to Kåtyåyana and Patañjali was different 
from the one known to Påˆini. It is of course but a small step from this to the conclusion 
that Kåtyåyana and Patañjali here refer to something different from the original dhåtupå†ha, 
or indeed: that they do not directly refer to the formal dhåtupå†ha at all, but to the long 
compound which one could form on the basis of this dhåtupå†ha and which would replace 
bhËvådaya˙; this long compound would of course begin with bhvedh. Seen in this way, the 
present passage from the Mahåbhå∑ya does not provide us with information about Påˆini's 
list of verbal roots. Since this passage constitutes the only early evidence for a dhåtupå†ha 
without meaning entries, evidence which is moreover contradicted by other evidence 
                                                
7 As does Bha††oji D¥k∑ita's Íabdakaustubha on P. 1.3.1 (ed. Gopål Íåstr¥ Nene, reprint Varanasi: Chowkhaba 
Sanskrit Series Office, 1991, vol. II p. 49): påˆinis tu ‘bhvedha’ ityådi apå†h¥d iti bhå∑yavårttikayo˙ spa∑†am. 
8 Similarly Cardona, 1997: 86. 
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derived both from Påˆini's grammar and from the Mahåbhå∑ya (not to mention the fact that 
the tradition of added meaning entries is unknown to grammatical authors until Kaiya†a), 
Cardona's reflections do in fact, unintentionally, add an argument in support of my position. 
 
Those who maintain that meaning entries were added later will have to make clear when 
this remake supposedly has taken place. This is no easy task, for the tradition that they were 
added is late (it is first mentioned by Kaiya†a), whereas earlier authors, such as the authors 
of the Kåßikå-v®tti, clearly consider the meaning entries authoritative and therefore original. 
The fact that the dhåtupå†ha of the Cåndra Vyåkaraˆa has the same meaning entries as the 
Påˆinian dhåtupå†ha would oblige one to date the addition of meaning entries in the early 
centuries of the common era. 
 How early exactly? Where classical Sanskrit literature is concerned, one can not 
really hope to go back further than Aßvagho∑a, the Buddhist author of the Saundarananda 
and the Buddhacarita.9 Aßvagho∑a was acquainted with a dhåtupå†ha, and it can be shown 
that he knew a dhåtupå†ha with meaning entries. 
 Consider first Saundarananda 12.9, which reads: 
 
babhËva sa hi saµvega˙ ßreyasas tasya v®ddhaye/  
dhåtur edhir ivåkhyåte pa†hito 'k∑aracintakai˙// 
 
Johnston (1928: 67-68) translates this as follows: 
 
For that agitation enured to increasing his tendency towards the highest good, just as 
the root edh is said by grammarians to take v®ddhi in its verbal form. 
 
In a note (text p. 155) Johnston explains that “[t]he reference is to [Påˆini] 6.1.89 
[etyedhatyË†hsu] which lays down that the roots edh and i take v®ddhi in exception to the 
general rule”. Some years later, in the introduction to his translation of the Buddhacarita, 
Johnston (1936: lxviii) expressed a different opinion, which he owed to Sten Konow: 
“[Saundarananda 12.9] not only refers to the rule in vi.1,89, which lays down that the root 
edh takes v®ddhi in exception to the general rule, but seems also to allude to the dhåtupå†has 
which explain this root as used in the meaning v®ddhau”. We have seen already that the 
present dhåtupå†ha begins with: bhË sattåyåm, edha v®ddhau. 
                                                
9 If, as is often maintained, Aßvagho∑a lived before Kani∑ka, he must have lived, in view of Harry Falk's 
(2001) recent findings, before 120 C. E. 
FROM MEANING TO UTTERANCE  9 
 
 
 It must be admitted that the second line of Aßvagho∑a's verse is obscure, and 
Johnston's initial translation is approximate at best. The expression åkhyåte in particular 
looks puzzling and does not easily fit either of the two intepretations proposed. It does 
normally mean ‘verb’ or ‘verbal form’, but Johnston's interpretation “the root edh is said by 
grammarians to take v®ddhi in its verbal form” makes no sense whatsoever. P. 6.1.89 does 
not prescribe v®ddhi for edh in its verbal form, but after a preposition ending in -a or -å. The 
word pa†hita, on the other hand, strongly suggests that Aßvagho∑a refers here to a, or the, 
dhåtupå†ha, for clearly in a dhåtupå†ha dhåtus are pa†hita. If, moreover, we agree with 
Johnston that ak∑aracintaka (lit. “those who think about syllables”) refers to grammarians, 
then the second line speaks about “the verbal root edh that has been taught/enumerated by 
the grammarians”. With regard to the puzzling expression åkhyåte, we may take recourse to 
the meaning ‘motive’ that can be expressed by the locative (P. 2.3.36 vt. 6 [nimittåt 
karmasaµyoge]; Filliozat, 1988: 87, §31b). Aßvagho∑a's second line then speaks of “the 
verbal root edh that has been taught/enumerated by the grammarians in view of a verbal 
form”. This makes sense, because the aim of the enumeration of verbal roots, which cannot 
as such be used in the language, is the creation of finite verbal forms, which can. However, 
in order to reach a full understanding of the second line we have to add some words from 
the first, presumably babhËva v®ddhaye. The verb bhË followed by a dative can express the 
meaning ‘belong to’ ‘be conducive to’. Since Aßvagho∑a is here playing with words, we are 
free to literally interpret his verse as follows: 
 
For that agitation was conducive to (babhËva + dative) the increase[d tendency] 
toward the highest good on his part, just as the verbal root edh that has been 
taught/enumerated by the grammarians in view of a verbal form belongs to 
(babhËva + dative) [the meaning] ‘increase’ (v®ddhi). 
 
If this interpretation is correct, Aßvagho∑a's acquaintance with a dhåtupå†ha in which the 
root edh figured along with the meaning entry v®ddhau is beyond doubt. 
 
The second passage to be considered occurs in the Buddhacarita. Buddhacarita 11.70 
illustrates nine senses of the root av. This verse reads: 
 
1avendravad divy 2ava ßaßvad arkavad guˆair 3ava ßreya ih4åva gåm 5ava/ 
6avåyur åryair 7ava satsutån 8ava ßriyaß ca råjann 9ava dharmam åtmana˙// 
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Johnston (1936: 163) translates: 
 
“1Be happy like Indra, 2shine ever like the sun, 3flourish with your virtues, 
4understand the highest good in this world, 5rule the earth, 6obtain long life, 
7protect the sons of the good with the Óryas, and 8enter into the glories of 
sovereignty, O king, 9observe your own dharma.” 
 
Johnston explains in a footnote (n. 70): “According to the grammarians (dhåtupå†ha, i. 631, 
etc.) the root av has eighteen senses, many of them probably assumed for etymological 
purposes, and ... there can be no doubt that Aßvagho∑a intends it to be understood in nine 
different ways here. ... The translation is ... necessarily tentative.” Chlodwig H. Werba, in 
the handout accompanying his Habilitationsvortrag of 23 June 1997, cites in this connection 
dhåtupå†ha I.631 in the following manner: ává 7rak∑aˆa-gati-kånti-1pr¥ti-t®pty-
4avagama-8praveßa-9ßravaˆa-5svåmyartha-yåcanakriyå+icchå-2d¥pty-6avåpty-
åli∫gana-hiµså-dåna-bhåga-3v®ddhi∑u. He further points out that the last imperative of 
the verse should have been translated: “listen to the dharma for your own sake / on your 
own”. It is clear that many of the meanings apparently used by Aßvagho∑a are not normally 
used in connection with the root av, but they all figure among the meanings accompanying 
this root in the Påˆinian dhåtupå†ha. The conclusion seems unavoidable that Aßvagho∑a 
knew this (or a closely similar) dhåtupå†ha, and that he used it to show off his grammatical 
knowledge. 
  
Both these cases show that Aßvagho∑a knew a dhåtupå†ha with meaning entries. This 
implies that those who wish to believe that these meaning entries were added after 
Patañjali, have to situate the author of this presumed transformation (who was called 
Bh¥masena according to Bha††oji D¥k∑ita10 and Någeßa Bha††a) within the short period of 
time that separates Patañjali from Aßvagho∑a. They can however save themselves this 
trouble by looking more closely into the arguments which suggest something different 
altogether. 
 
 
                                                
10 So his Íabdakaustubha on P. 1.3.1 (ed. Gopål Íåstr¥ Nene, reprint Varanasi: Chowkhaba Sanskrit Series 
Office, 1991, vol. II p. 49).  
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